맹자 제임스레게 21
Mencius Chapter 21
1. The philosopher Kâo said, ‘Man’s nature is like the ch’î-willow , and righteousness is like a cup or a bowl. The fashioning benevolence and righteousness out of man’s nature is like the making cups and bowls from the ch’î-willow.’
2. Mencius replied, ‘Can you, leaving untouched the nature of the willow, make with it cups and bowls? You must do violence and injury to the willow, before you can make cups and bowls with it. If you must do violence and injury to the willow in order to make cups and bowls with it, on your principles you must in the same way do violence and injury to humanity in order to fashion from it benevolence and righteousness! Your words, alas! would certainly lead all men on to reckon benevolence and righteousness to be calamities.’
1. The philosopher Kâo said, ‘Man’s nature is like water whirling round in a corner. Open a passage for it to the east, and it will flow to the east; open a passage for it to the west, and it will flow to the west. Man’s nature is indifferent to good and evil, just as the water is indifferent to the east and west.’
2. Mencius replied, ‘Water indeed will flow indifferently to the east or west, but will it flow indifferently up or down? The tendency of man’s nature to good is like the tendency of water to flow downwards. There are none but have this tendency to good, just as all water flows downwards.
3. ‘Now by striking water and causing it to leap up, you may make it go over your forehead, and, by damming and leading it you may force it up a hill;– but are such movements according to the nature of water? It is the force applied which causes them. When men are made to do what is not good, their nature is dealt with in this way.’
1. The philosopher Kâo said, ‘Life is what we call nature!’
2. Mencius asked him, ‘Do you say that by nature you mean life, just as you say that white is white?’ ‘Yes, I do,’ was the reply. Mencius added, ‘Is the whiteness of a white feather like that of white snow, and the whiteness of white snow like that of white jade?’ Kâo again said ‘Yes.’
3. ‘Very well,’ pursued Mencius. ‘Is the nature of a dog like the nature of an ox, and the nature of an ox like the nature of a man?’
1. The philosopher Kâo said, ‘To enjoy food and delight in colours is nature. Benevolence is internal and not external; righteousness is external and not internal.’
2. Mencius asked him, ‘What is the ground of your saying that benevolence is internal and righteousness external?’ He replied, ‘There is a man older than I, and I give honour to his age. It is not that there is first in me a principle of such reverence to age. It is just as when there is a white man, and I consider him white; according as he is so externally to me. On this account, I pronounce of righteousness that it is external.’
3. Mencius said, ‘There is no difference between our pronouncing a white horse to be white and our pronouncing a white man to be white. But is there no difference between the regard with which we acknowledge the age of an old horse and that with which we acknowledge the age of an old man? And what is it which is called righteousness?– the fact of a man’s being old? or the fact of our giving honour to his age?’
4. Kâo said, ‘There is my younger brother;– I love him. But the younger brother of a man of Ch’in I do not love: that is, the feeling is determined by myself, and therefore I say that benevolence is internal. On the other hand, I give honour to an old man of Ch’û, and I also give honour to an old man of my own people: that is, the feeling is determined by the age, and therefore I say that righteousness is external.’
5. Mencius answered him, ‘Our enjoyment of meat roasted by a man of Ch’in does not differ from our enjoyment of meat roasted by ourselves. Thus, what you insist on takes place also in the case of such things, and will you say likewise that our enjoyment of a roast is external?’
1. The disciple Mang Chî asked Kung-tû, saying, ‘On what ground is it said that righteousness is internal?’
2. Kung-tû replied, ‘We therein act out our feeling of respect, and therefore it is said to be internal.’
3. The other objected, ‘Suppose the case of a villager older than your elder brother by one year, to which of them would you show the greater respect?’ ‘To my brother,’ was the reply. ‘But for which of them would you first pour out wine at a feast?’ ‘For the villager.’ Mang Chî argued, ‘Now your feeling of reverence rests on the one, and now the honour due to age is rendered to the other;– this is certainly determined by what is without, and does not proceed from within.’
4. Kung-tû was unable to reply, and told the conversation to Mencius. Mencius said, ‘You should ask him, “Which do you respect most,– your uncle, or your younger brother?” He will answer, “My uncle.” Ask him again, “If your younger brother be personating a dead ancestor, to which do you show the greater respect,– to him or to your uncle?” He will say, “To my younger brother.” You can go on, “But where is the respect due, as you said, to your uncle?” He will reply to this, “I show the respect to my younger brother, because of the position which he occupies,” and you can likewise say, “So my respect to the villager is because of the position which he occupies. Ordinarily, my respect is rendered to my elder brother; for a brief season, on occasion, it is rendered to the villager.”‘
5. Mang Chî heard this and observed, ‘When respect is due to my uncle, I respect him, and when respect is due to my younger brother, I respect him;– the thing is certainly determined by what is without, and does not proceed from within.’ Kung-tû replied, ‘In winter we drink things hot, in summer we drink things cold; and so, on your principle, eating and drinking also depend on what is external!’
1. The disciple Kung-tû said, ‘The philosopher Kâo says, “Man’s nature is neither good nor bad.”
2. ‘Some say, “Man’s nature may be made to practise good, and it may be made to practise evil, and accordingly, under Wan and Wû, the people loved what was good, while under Yû and Lî, they loved what was cruel.”
3. ‘Some say, “The nature of some is good, and the nature of others is bad. Hence it was that under such a sovereign as Yâo there yet appeared Hsiang; that with such a father as Kû-sâu there yet appeared Shun; and that with Châu for their sovereign, and the son of their elder brother besides, there were found Ch’î, the viscount of Wei, and the prince Pî-Kan.
4. ‘And now you say, “The nature is good.” Then are all those wrong?’
5. Mencius said, ‘From the feelings proper to it, it is constituted for the practice of what is good. This is what I mean in saying that the nature is good.
6. ‘If men do what is not good, the blame cannot be imputed to their natural powers.
7. ‘The feeling of commiseration belongs to all men; so does that of shame and dislike; and that of reverence and respect; and that of approving and disapproving. The feeling of commiseration implies the principle of benevolence; that of shame and dislike, the principle of righteousness; that of reverence and respect, the principle of propriety; and that of approving and disapproving, the principle of knowledge. Benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and knowledge are not infused into us from without. We are certainly furnished with them. And a different view is simply owing to want of reflection. Hence it is said, “Seek and you will find them. Neglect and you will lose them.” Men differ from one another in regard to them;– some as much again as others, some five times as much, and some to an incalculable amount:– it is because they cannot carry out fully their natural powers.
8. ‘It is said in the Book of Poetry,
“Heaven in producing mankind,
Gave them their various faculties and relations with their specific laws.
These are the invariable rules of nature for all to hold,
And all love this admirable virtue.”
Confucius said, “The maker of this ode knew indeed the principle of our nature!” We may thus see that every faculty and relation must have its law, and since there are invariable rules for all to hold, they consequently love this admirable virtue.’
1. Mencius said, ‘In good years the children of the people are most of them good, while in bad years the most of them abandon themselves to evil. It is not owing to any difference of their natural powers conferred by Heaven that they are thus different. The abandonment is owing to the circumstances through which they allow their minds to be ensnared and drowned in evil.
2. ‘There now is barley.– Let it be sown and covered up; the ground being the same, and the time of sowing likewise the same, it grows rapidly up, and, when the full time is come, it is all found to be ripe. Although there may be inequalities of produce, that is owing to the difference of the soil, as rich or poor, to the unequal nourishment afforded by the rains and dews, and to the different ways in which man has performed his business in reference to it.
3. ‘Thus all things which are the same in kind are like to one another;– why should we doubt in regard to man, as if he were a solitary exception to this? The sage and we are the same in kind.
4. ‘In accordance with this the scholar Lung said, “If a man make hempen sandals without knowing the size of people’s feet, yet I know that he will not make them like baskets.” Sandals are all like one another, because all men’s feet are like one another.
5. ‘So with the mouth and flavours;– all mouths have the same relishes. Yî-yâ only apprehended before me what my mouth relishes. Suppose that his mouth in its relish for flavours differed from that of other men, as is the case with dogs or horses which are not the same in kind with us, why should all men be found following Yî-yâ in their relishes? In the matter of tastes all the people model themselves after Yî-yâ; that is, the mouths of all men are like one another.
6. ‘And so also it is with the ear. In the matter of sounds, the whole people model themselves after the music-master K’wang; that is, the ears of all men are like one another.
7. ‘And so also it is with the eye. In the case of Tsze-tû, there is no man but would recognise that he was beautiful. Any one who would not recognise the beauty of Tsze-tû must have no eyes.
8. ‘Therefore I say,– Men’s mouths agree in having the same relishes; their ears agree in enjoying the same sounds; their eyes agree in recognising the same beauty:– shall their minds alone be without that which the similarly approve? What is it then of which they similarly approve? It is, I say, the principles of our nature, and the determinations of righteousness. The sages only apprehended before me that of which my mind approves along with other men. Therefore the principles of our nature and the determinations of righteousness are agreeable to my mind, just as the flesh of grass and grain-fed animals is agreeable to my mouth.’
1. Mencius said, ‘The trees of the Niû mountain were once beautiful. Being situated, however, in the borders of a large State, they were hewn down with axes and bills;– and could they retain their beauty? Still through the activity of the vegetative life day and night, and the nourishing influence of the rain and dew, they were not without buds and sprouts springing forth, but then came the cattle and goats and browsed upon them. To these things is owing the bare and stripped appearance of the mountain, and when people now see it, they think it was never finely wooded. But is this the nature of the mountain?
2. ‘And so also of what properly belongs to man;– shall it be said that the mind of any man was without benevolence and righteousness? The way in which a man loses his proper goodness of mind is like the way in which the trees are denuded by axes and bills. Hewn down day after day, can it– the mind– retain its beauty? But there is a development of its life day and night, and in the calm air of the morning, just between night and day, the mind feels in a degree those desires and aversions which are proper to humanity, but the feeling is not strong, and it is fettered and destroyed by what takes place during the day. This fettering taking place again and again, the restorative influence of the night is not sufficient to preserve the proper goodness of the mind; and when this proves insufficient for that purpose, the nature becomes not much different from that of the irrational animals, and when people now see it, they think that it never had those powers which I assert. But does this condition represent the feelings proper to humanity?
3. ‘Therefore, if it receive its proper nourishment, there is nothing which will not grow. If it lose its proper nourishment, there is nothing which will not decay away.
4. ‘Confucius said, “Hold it fast, and it remains with you. Let it go, and you lose it. Its outgoing and incoming cannot be defined as to time or place.” It is the mind of which this is said!’